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  Abstract. Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands 
as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on 
how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a 
contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, 
willingness to assign (WTAS). Moreover, we elicited contingent rankings as well as the 
willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes.  We argue that WTAS reveals 
relative (monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a 
hypothetical healthcare budget assessment.  Experimental evidence is reported from a 
deliberative empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan 
Health Service. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that preferences are 
internally more consistent and slightly less affected by ‘preference reversals’ as 
compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid 
possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health 
received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked 
highly.    
 
JEL classification: D70, I18, H43, and D63.  
Key words: health system benefits, willingness to pay, willingness to assign. 
 
 
    
Resum. La millora de la participació col·lectiva en la presa de decisions es presenta 
con un dels objectius principals de la reforma dels sistemes sanitaris. No obstant això, la 
evidencia respecte a com estimar les preferències entre programes sanitaris es encara 
limitada. Aquest article examina una eina d’elecció contingent per estimar les 
preferències per programes sanitaris anomenada disposició a assignar (DAS). La DAS 
revela la valoració (monetària) relativa d’un conjunt de programes sanitaris que 
hipotèticament poden formar part d’un pressupost de reforma fix.  L’article presenta 
evidencia d’un estudi experimental de reforma de les prestacions del Servei Català de la 
Salut. S’estimen les preferències per múltiples programes  utilitzant la DAS juntament 
amb altres eines d’elecció. Els resultats indiquen que la DAS és més consistent que 
altres tècniques com ara la disposició a pagar (DAP) impostos addicionals.  El mètode 
deliberatiu de revelació de preferències sembla haver millorat la revelació de 
preferències. Tot i que els programes més valorats són aquells que comporten millores 
de salut, altres programes que suposen millores en l’equitat o en altres beneficis del 
sistema com ara els beneficis de procés són altament valorats.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In collectively financed health systems, setting priorities among healthcare programmes 
can be often envisaged as a decision making problem of choosing from a portfolio of 
competing programmes, each one achieving large-scale benefits, which are constrained by a 
fixed budget with which to fund them all. In undertaking a budgetary programme, one key 
issue is the measurement of programmes benefits based on public tradeoffs as revealed by 
citizens. Public values are considered as necessary inputs to public decisions if decisions are 
directed to satisfactory provision of health care programmes. However, there is still 
widespread agreement on a suitable method to effectively elicit the benefits of a broad range 
of programmes.  Therefore, we believe there is still space for methodologically oriented 
research to examine how different elicitation methods perform in assisting priority setting in 
health care.  
 
Much research has been undertaken on measuring values and eliciting preferences for 
health programmes. The most widely accepted method for measuring benefits in health and 
healthcare is the quality adjusted life-years (QALY) approach. However, significant 
controversies have emerged both with regard to the underlying decision-making model, 
around particularly regarding the assumptions of which benefits are seen as relevant to health 
decision-making, which we shall concentrate on here. Primarily, QALYs fail to include health 
system dimensions other than health gains, namely process utility and equity benefits, among 
others (Donaldson, 1990; Olsen, 1997; Mooney, 1994; Money, 1995; Pauly, 1995; Donaldson 
and Shacley, 1997; Olsen and Donaldson, 1998). Although some attempts have been 
undertaken from an extra-welfarist approach (Nord et al., 1995; Nord et al., 1999), both cost 
effectiveness analysis (CEA) may exhibit difficulties in capturing important trade-offs 
between the underlying dimensions of health programmes in that they rely exclusively on 
health gains.   Furthermore, even when evaluating healthcare programmes that achieve only 
health gain benefits, there is evidence indicating that individual valuations of health gain 
might be programme-dependent (Eddy, 1991). Therefore, alternative preference elicitation 
methods might be preferable if they impose no restriction on the nature of benefits under 
valuation.   
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The alternative method to CEA in the light of economic evaluation is the willingness 
to pay (WTP) approach. From a theoretical standpoint WTP methods ideally capture the 
existing wide range of benefits under valuation. Moreover, elicited values provide an 
indication of preference strength (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Shackley, 1997; Olsen 
and Donsaldson, 1998, Shackley and Donaldson, 2000; Thomas et al., 2000, Stewart et al., 
2002). However, few studies that have been undertaken in valuing multiple programmes to 
assist priority-setting in collective health systems indicate some difficulties, among them a 
significant discrepancy between programme rankings and WTP (Stewart et al., 2002), a 
protest bias as some people may not be willing to pay any extra taxes (Thomas et al., 2000), 
and difficulties in envisaging the opportunity costs of certain programmes as well as budget 
constrain. Although some of these drawbacks are currently under research and seem to show 
appealing results (e.g., allowing WTP to be elicited for multiple programmes), one might 
argue that WTP methods fail to capture the nature of social preferences in collectively-funded 
health care. That is, they rarely contemplate explicitly the collective budget restriction - 
whereby funding some programmes implies not funding others - that individuals face as 
citizens in addition to that of health care usurers. Indeed, Kanheman and Ritov (1997) find 
that in a collective context, WTP measures may elicit the willingness to contribute rather than 
consumers’ preferences. Thus, even when budget information is provided for limited number 
of programmes, it’s rarely contextualised with the opportunity costs and tradeoffs related to 
other programs that could be collectively funded.  
  
Thus, we believe that if preference elicitation methods should guide priority-setting 
decisions, alternative methods might need to be designed to focus on how preferences should 
be elicited in the context of a choosing among a set of programs involving on the one hand a 
multiplicity of health system benefit dimensions and, on the other hand searching for a 
collective choice decision making scenario where individuals are expected to choose as 
citizens by taking into account opportunity costs of funding other programmes. This method 
allow a wider generalisation than alternatives tools such as the willingness to wait (Thomas et 
al., 2000) and conjoint analysis techniques which still rely on individuals rather than social 
preferences.  In particular, some recent approaches in the public budgeting literature are 
remarkable such as budget games have been developed to balance a government budget as a 
tool to priority setting (Peters, 1996). Robins and Simonsen (2002) develop a preference 
elicitation method where they link WTP for their shares of desired levels of public 
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expenditure to the budget constraint faces by decision makers. In a recent study, Blomquist et 
al (2004) develop a similar technique to balance a budget to collect individual’s relative 
values of public programs in a context in which allocations are consistent with a fixed 
amount. 
 
This study examines the experimental evidence of a contingent choice elicitation tool with 
the aim of eliciting collective preferences for health programmes. The tool analysed is a 
money metric budget-based instrument that we name as ‘willingness to assign’ (WTAS)1.  
Similar methods have been outlined in the literature, such as the budget pie experiments 
dating back to Clark (1974), Robins and Simonsen (2002) and Blomquist et al (2004). The 
WTAS can be viewed as an adaptation of the willingness to pay approach to a collective 
setting (Dolan et al., 2002), in order to take into account the budgetary constraints of the 
health system.  Respondents were selected from specific social groups (for example, trade 
unions, neighbourhoods, etc) and were required to assign the amount of disposable budget 
which is collectively funded to a set of potentially competing health programmes. WTAS 
values represent a collective assessment of the social preference strength for alternative 
programmes.  In so doing we aim to capture possible trade-offs between the programmes that 
individuals as citizens perceive in a political market. The remarkable feature of this setting is 
that in a political market individuals are supposed to exhibit expressive behaviour (Common, 
1997). Therefore they evaluate health programmes according to their perceived concerns over 
their broader social impact rather than solely for their individual benefits. Arguably, the 
method allows one to capture both the complementarily and exclusivity of healthcare 
programmes, and to reveal the opportunity costs forgone when assigning funds to specific 
programmes. This instrument is compared with the willingness to pay approach for 
comparative purposes and consistency is examined by comparing the results with a previous 
contingent ranking elicited by the participants in the study.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual 
background, and offers a further discussion of the methodology.  Section 3 is devoted to the 
study design. In Section 4 we report the results attained and section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of those results.  
                                                 
1 It was designed as in the light of a research programme aiming at finding quantitative measures to measuring 
the monitoring of health system performance, with the specific objective of identifying priority-setting 
mechanisms 
 3
2. The WTAS method  
 
Under publicly financed systems healthcare can be envisaged as a ‘community commodity’.  
Therefore, arguably individuals take the role of social decision-makers when eliciting 
preferences for goods that would not only affect their own welfare, but rather others among 
them might be affected (Dolan et al., 2002).  If this assumption holds true then preferences 
among a  set of competing health programmes may have at least two different dimensions: an 
individual (or selfish) and a collective dimension. Therefore, some share of the individual 
intensity of preferences for different health programmes may be seen as interdependent or 
interpersonal (Mooney, 1994). Interpersonal preferences hypothetically are captured through 
the willingness to pay (WTP) methods identifying ‘altruistic’ preferences when individuals 
are asked about their willingness to contribute to the funding of certain programmes that 
provide no benefit to themselves (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998). However, in revealing their 
social preferences individuals might exhibit concerns over fairness which differ from altruistic 
concerns in that they might represent either inequality aversion or reciprocal fairness (Fehr 
and Fishbacher, 2002).  
 
One way of  interpreting social preferences in this context is  the Margolian approach of 
the ‘fair share’ allocation rule (Margolis, 1982). According to this approach, human 
psychology in the allocation of resources always show a trade-off between individual and 
social values; that is, individuals have to choose between selfishness and collective interest. 
This study sets out to amplify individual utility functions to include something more that 
individual utility and using specific aggregation rules may have some influence on revealed 
preferences. Community preferences imply that individuals may not answer to the WTP 
questionnaire as individual decision-makers, but rather as citizens. One possible method to 
elicit and include interdependent preferences may be the use of WTP in a political market 
scenario.  Within a WTP setting, Olsen and Donaldson (1998) elicited the willingness to 
contribute in terms of extra earmarked taxation per annum for a helicopter ambulance service 
and two alternative programmes.  They found some zero protests to the payment method, 
even though these were small participants found difficulties in stating their willingness to pay. 
Moreover, absolute values had to be re-scaled into relative preferences and no direct rankings 
were calculated to test consistency. Finally distributional concerns emerged as relevant, since 
the willingness to pay is linked to the ability to pay, which is not the principle guiding the 
NHS  funding.  
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The WTAS method is based on asking what is the maximum amount that individuals would 
assign to a given set of healthcare programmes within the constraints of a fixed budget. It  
requires individuals to act as decision-makers  as members of a simulated political healthcare 
market. Results on the absolute amount individuals assign to specific programmes are 
meaningless, insofar as they rely on the defined budget constraint. Therefore, we examine 
values in terms of relative preferences which might be interpreted as providing the preference 
strength for specific health care programmes.   The rationale of this research relies on the need 
to elicit collective priorities in order to guide health decision-making. In a political market, 
respondents are compelled to elicit their preferences as hypothetical citizens, therefore 
involving altruistic concerns. Thus, individuals are free to value a wide range of dimensions 
concerning health system benefits. The idea derives from a general discussion offered by 
Common (1997) on valuing environmental benefits. He suggests that when ‘socially wider 
benefits’ are valued, even though individual answers correspond to a contingent market 
question format, the answers in fact represent their preferences as citizens.  
 
Since the problem that this paper examines is part of social decision-making, we consider the 
decision-making unit as being held by small groups , representative of a societal profile 
(  ). Let us assume a hypothetical health system resource allocation problem for a 
public health agency (i.e the Catalan Health Service (CHS) in Catalunya). At that time the 
CHS had planned  a 4,000 million PTAs budget increase —  equal to 24 million euros — to 
be devoted  to the funding of a possible set of ‘new programs’.
)( in
∑= }{ inN
2 Decision-makers have to 
evaluate a number of programmes (i.e ten programmes) that have been proposed for funding 
according to the revealed benefits. The total cost of those programmes is in excess of the fixed 
capital budget, therefore some programmes may not be funded. The problem therefore is to 
select a set of programmes — within the budgetary constraints — which best meet the 
perceived health system benefits. We assume the existence of multidimensional benefits that  
people perceive in health systems. Therefore, a multidimensional utility model would be a 
clear foundation from which to explain the decision process.  
                                                 
2  A new programme implies an increase in health system coverage, in the sense that it improves the 
on the remaining set of benefits that the system aims to offer. However, alternatively one might 
consider the opposite decision-making problems, that is, a reduction in health system coverage. The 
problem between considering one or other decision-making context is the same, in that it may change 
results considerably..    
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The theoretical instrument for assigning values to health programmes is formalised as a social 
evaluation function. A social evaluation function is a numerical representation of an 
individual social welfare judgement regarding a certain course of action, such a healthcare 
programs presumably embodying the welfare value judgements of society regarding health 
system benefits.  Let   be an allocation set of possible health programmes 
each one showing a particular dimension of health system benefits . 
Therefore, for all social states S is a measurable subset of Y, Y(X) is a monotonic 
transformation of  X. The assumption of this paper is that each individual values each Y 
according to a social welfare judgement as if s/he was a decision-maker who cares about 
overall social welfare    :  
n
n RYYY ∈= ),....,( 1
n
n RXXX ),.......,( 1=
 
                                                                                        (1) ))(),......(())(( 1 n
jjj
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where  is the value function, that is a numerical individual welfare judgement on the 
basis of sufficient  information to  be assessed for each programme. We do not  assume that 
all individuals  in society arrive at the the same judgements,  but  we  do assume that within 
every group there will be a high degree of consensus over which benefits are valued higher.   
(X)v j
 
We define a social evaluation function (Brekke, 1996) for different dimensions of health 
system benefits.  In the interest of simplicity we adopt the additive utility function and 
therefore we assume additive independence. The multidimensional utility function is as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                 (2)    XvkXv
5
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where k reflects the relative valuation of the utility of  the benefit in the total individual 
social value  function  of individual i , where total value is restricted by budget constraints as 
follows: 
jX
 
                                                                                       (3) inn
i
11 vkvkV ∆++∆=∆ ....................
 
Therefore, if  programme  is socially preferred to programme , then . 1Y 2Y ))(())(( XYvXYv 21 ≥
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Let us consider a citizen acting as a decision-maker that has to assess an amount of monetary 
units as a result of a budgetary increase to a set of health care programmes , 
each one displaying a particular dimension of health system benefits . The 
initial healthcare programmes available within a system are , while their 
associated budget is . A health system reform is viewed as an extension of 
the former programmes  that has an associated budget of 
),....,( 1 nYYY =
n
n RXXX ∈= ),.......,( 1
),....,( 0100 nYYY =
),.....,( 0100 nMMM =
),....,( *1** nYYY = *M that should be 
assessed according to its benefits. Then, the willingness to assign approach attempts to 
determine the amount of monetary units that, independent of costs, each participant would 
assign according to their social welfare gains. This can be formally represented as the 
difference between two social expenditure functions as follows:  
 
                                                                                          (4) ),(),( 0*** jj YVEYVEWTAS −=
 
where reflects the final  welfare value .  *V
 
 
3. Methods  
 
Although survey-based questionnaires tend to be preferred due to their convenience in terms 
of larger sample size, the aim of this study is to test a new method of eliciting preferences for 
competing health programmes rather than to achieve a representative sample of the 
population. The methodological approach adopted is based on the use of the small 
deliberative groups that previously participated in focus groups on the problems of the health 
system. This methodology, although sacrificing the large sample of alternative techniques 
gains a great depth of information, while maintaining the survey design. Accordingly, we 
have directed our towards a few specific groups of the general public in order to elicit what 
we might call ‘reasoned preferences’. Table 1 gives a description of the groups involved. 
Individuals participated in deliberative groups according to their socioeconomic status.  
Moreover, participants were provided with an information processing task that they were 
equipped to undertake — according to their cultural and educational level. Furthermore, 
valuation was preceded by a deliberation on the benefits of each programme taking some 40-
60 minutes, which in turn warmed up participants to the processes involved in the health 
system. The standard value elicitation surveys are constrained in what regards  improvingthe 
reasoning and resolveing apparent contradictions in answers through a check conducted after 
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a discussion around those answers. Therefore the preference and values obtained by using this 
method are expected to express more precisely real decision-making in any field. Indeed, 
deliberation was shown to assist individuals in stating preferences for healthcare programmes, 
in that participants were able to undertake their required valuation exercises in less than 30 
minutes. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of the effect of deliberation in providing 
reasoning while eliciting preferences (Dolan et al, 1999 and Cookson and Dolan, 2000).  
Additional evidence on the importance of deliberation on the valuation of risk and safety is 
found in Cookson (2000).   
 
 
Table 1. 
 Participants in the Study 
 
 Segmentation 
Criteria 
Educational Level Group 
Number 
Male Mean Age 
G1 Low Income Undergraduate 
students 
13 7 25 
G2 Middle High Income Skilled workers 8 6 47 
G3 Middle –Low Income Industrial workers 15 12 39 
G4 Middle – High 
Income 
Post graduate students 13 5 32 
G5 High Income Groups Skilled professionals 9 3 42 
G6 Middle-Low Trade union officials 8 5 57 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Programme :  BREAST CANCER 
 
Expected Outcome: a 15% reduction in mortality  
 
Description:  Extension to the risk population of a programme to eradicate breast cancer. It will be 
implemented by a mailing quotation in order to realise a biennial mammography to all the women 
between 50 and 65 years.  Currently it covers the 15% of the population. 
 
 
 
 
Respondents were given some details on the Catalan health service as well as on the 
budget restrictions that it faces. The system of policy decision-making was explained to 
respondents as involving a set of programmes to be implemented up to the limits of the 
available disposable budget. Subsequently, participants were asked to attach their willingness 
to assign under a hypothetical budget increase hypothetically collectively funded by taxes. 
Participants were asked to act as if they were advisors for the Catalan Health Plan — in order 
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to improve realism a summarised public health system budget was provided. During the 
questioning, participants were reminded that the amount assigned to every programme has 
been partially paid by their taxes and that in future they will continue to pay an undetermined 
proportional amount through the current financing mechanisms.3 They were asked to imagine 
that the proportional taxes paid to the public sector had been returned and they were 
participating in the reassessment of a hypothetical budget increase.  However, since they were 
asked to act as decision-makers, altruistic concerns were in fact inherent in their responses.  
 
One of the potential problems with this experiment may be that it may involve 
complex decisions requiring a protracted reasoning process. Moreover, a second problem 
could relate to the framing format. Since individuals may have little experience in allocating 
public funds, they could find the experiment difficult to perform. In order to overcome this 
possible limitation the chosen scenario was defined in a simple way. The experiments were 
undertaken by grouping individuals of similar social class and skills, which enabled some 
prior discussion. Finally, the valuation process relied on eliciting a contingent ranking of 
those programs evaluated, which enables the testing of the consistency of individual 
responses to the WTAS questionnaire. Then, respondents were stated their WTAS for each 
programme and one of the groups responded as well to an exercise on the willingness to pay 
taxes for comparative purposes.4  The implementation procedure required in many cases an 
effort to aid responses, i.e some people were reminded to imagine that they had to purchase 
the weekly food for their family in the market and they had a fixed amount of money with 
which to buy it. Moreover, they were not required to spend the whole budget, if they did not 
then the remaining money would be assigned to other public sector benefits. However, all of 
them did.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3  We did not want to describe accurately the payment mechanism since then ‘protest bias’ could arise,  we 
simply said that  it would be collectively financed. The advantage is that this prevents strategical behaviour, 
since the individual participation in this healthcare ‘reform’ is not defined. The disadvantage is that there is a 
greater probability of a moral satisfaction bias.   
4  One of the main features in applying this method is that it can be seen as simulating a real voting process and 
at the same time is a conformable exercise of assigning a budget to different goods as in the family decision-
making process, even though the context of the decision-making was far from that of the individual/familiar 
decision regarding how to assign a monthly salary.   
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Table 2. Healthcare  Reference Competing Programmes  
 
Programme Benefit dimension and expected outcomes  
  
1.Breast Cancer: Biennial Mammography to all the 
women aged between  50 and 65. 
Health Gain 
(15% mortality reduction) 
 
2.Coordination between primary and specialist care: 
programmed meetings between Primary Attention 
Centres and specialists 
Process 
(Improvement of quality attention due to a major 
integration and co-ordination of patient attention) 
 
3. Professional immediate access to clinical history: 
information system to obtain clinical information on 
patients  immediately. 
Process 
(Improvement in the efficacy and quality of 
attention) 
 
 
4.Attention and user information: information 
campaign to improve user attention units. 
Process 
 (Improvement in access, information and user’s 
satisfaction) 
 
5.User treatment: education programme consisting 
of 30-hour courses for the administrative personnel 
on the treatment of users. 
 
Process 
(Improvement in patient satisfaction)  
 
6. Medical check: voluntary medical check for the 
whole population every three years 
Health gain 
 Preventive detection  and health  consultation on 
hypertension, alcoholism and gynaecological 
problems. 
 
7.Waiting lists: plan for reducing accumulated 
waiting lists in non elective  surgery  
Process 
Reduction of the waiting time from 240 to  120 
days 
 
8. Lifestyles: informational programme on healthy 
lifestyles to children addressed at parents . 
Health gain 
Promotion of healthy lifestyles, improving 
scholar’s communication and collaboration 
between parents and children. 
 
9.Odontology  (access to free dental care for 
children under 12, currently only extractions 
covered ) 
Equity 
Improvement of  dental health of less affluent 
families. 
 
10. Medicines Bonus: annual bonus per worker in 
order to avoid co-payments which  relate to  
declared income on the personal income tax.  
Equity 
(Improvement in equity. Nobody would pay 
more, but people with less income could be  
benefited. The current situation is  that people 
should pay the 40% of the price of medicines 
while for chronic  illness it is 10%.) 
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Six deliberative groups recorded their preferences among ten competing health 
programmes (see Figure 1 and Table 2) between December 1998 and June 2000. Sessions 
lasted about two hours and participants were encouraged to participate in a dinner on 
completion of their session. The groups were selected with the advice of two social 
researchers. When selecting the groups, time availability was considered as was the 
willingness to participate. Therefore, the ideal group profile should be one that meets some 
active mobility conditions in terms of the interpersonal social relationship network and 
contains the sufficient number of people (6 to 15).   
 
 
In order to design a realistic healthcare programme choice scenario, we sought advice 
from headquarter-managers of the Catalan health service. The design led to a set of  ‘new’ but 
applicable  health care programmes that were supposed to improve the status quo as regards 
coverage. When selecting the number of programmes, the results from a focus group 
experiment were taken into account, as this part of the experiment was viewed as a 
continuation of the previous one. The programmes were described in a card and a set of 
questionnaires was designed containing a programme description.  
 
Three different elicitation methods were employed:   
 
The contingent ranking . This is a simple ranking method   hypothetically capturing the 
ordinal priority of different programmes. Participants provide their rankings on a numerical 
scale of 1–10.  
 
Question (1): Please could you rank each programme ( after every single programme had 
beens explained and comprehension was ensured) from 1(the least preferred) to 10 (the most 
preferred)? 
 
Willingness to assign (WTA).  This was based on an open-ended valuation question that 
considered  a hypothetical budgetary increase  Respondents were asked to assign from a fixed  
remaining budget the amount of public resources that they were willing to devote to each 
programme. The idea underlying this method is one of relative values and trade-offs, therefore 
any budget size variation according to the monoticity criteria should not affect the preferences 
elicited, as they were considered in terms of relative values.  
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Question 2:  Imagine the possibility of setting yourself the priorities  of the health system as if 
you were the decision maker. Imagine you have 4,000 million PTAs (20.4 million euros)  (say 
4,000 for simplicity) and you were asked to assign the money to each health programme in 
the system (you do not have to exhaust the whole budget, this would be interpreted as 
devoting resources to other sectors). How would you as a  ‘citizen’ assign public resources.  
 
Willingness to pay taxes.  This scenario relied on the hypothetical context in which the 
subject imagined that s/he was  an individual earning an annual  wage of 12,000 euros and 
paying a 20 per cent tax, assuming a flat tax rate. A payment card was employed so that each 
participant  could tick a specific amount for each programme. The question was framed as 
follows: 
 
How much in  extra tax are you willing to pay for  programme X ? 
 
(0, 3 euros, 6 euros, 12 euros, 18 euros, 30 euros, 60 euros,120 euros  or 240 euros) 
 
 
The hypothetical scenario defined in this study was fully understood after some discussion.  
However, the test for the willingness to pay taxes yielded a significant number of refusals or 
protest responses, since three participants merely answered that they would not pay any extra 
taxes for additional funds. The use of this method might allow one to examine the extent to 
which the WTAS instrument improves the remaining elicitation methods.  
 
 
4. Results   
 
A total of  66 people participated in the exercises. Participants felt comfortable with these 
exercises, despite the large number of programmes, and few participants needed help to 
complete the WTAS exercise, which suggests that it was understood, although for future 
research the practical implementation should be carried out. No significant differences were 
found in terms of age and gender.  
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Table 3. Mean WTAS (in million euros) and WTP Taxes (in  euros) 
 
Programme G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 WTP (G4) 
1 4.640 2.463 3.125 4.085 3.06 3.95 61.1 
2 1.648 1.239 1.592 2.643 1.99 1.68 41.7 
3 2.139 1.390 2.496 1.703 2.23 1.27 0.0 
4 0.701 1.629 1.449 1.198 1.51 1.02 45.4 
5 0.892 1.668 1.857 1.401 1.96 1.63 42.7 
6 3.971 3.030 3.329 3.977 2.25 3.26 54.7 
7 3.227 4.886 3.611 2.739 2.37 2.82 30.6 
8 0.801 2.288 1.885 1.747 1.16 1.79 31.1 
9 2.794 2.587 2.510 3.024 2.20 2.99 12.8 
10 3.227 2.860 2.185 1.524 1.92 2.02 10 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Share of the Collective Budget (%) 
 
Programme G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 
1 19.3% 10.2% 13.0% 17.0% 14.8% 17.6% 
2 6.9% 5.2% 6.6% 11.0% 9.6% 7.5% 
3 8.9% 5.8% 10.4% 7.1% 10.8% 5.7% 
4 2.9% 6.8% 6.0% 5.0% 7.3% 4.6% 
5 3.7% 6.9% 7.7% 5.8% 9.5% 7.3% 
6 16.5% 12.6% 13.8% 16.5% 10.9% 14.5% 
7 13.4% 20.3% 15.0% 11.4% 11.5% 12.6% 
8 3.3% 9.5% 7.8% 7.3% 5.6% 8.0% 
9 11.6% 10.8% 10.4% 12.6% 10.6% 13.3% 
10 13.4% 11.9% 9.1% 6.3% 9.3% 9.0% 
 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the WTAS both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
the budget. Interestingly, although there were significant differences between groups when 
compared in pairs, results indicate that some of the most valued programmes do not vary 
significantly across groups. In addition, standard deviation was quite stable at least for the 
willingness to assign responses. Additionally, when a test for equality of means was 
undertaken results confirm the rejection of the null hypothesis, that is preferences seem to be 
complete, people prefer one programme to another. The programmes that were found to be 
more valued were the medical check (programme 6) and the breast cancer (programme 1) 
offering health gain benefits, along with waiting list programme (programme 7)  bringing 
process utility benefits and the dentistry  (programme 9) and medical bonus programmes 
(programme 10), bringing equity benefits. Therefore, these results emphasise that there may 
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be more than just health gains in the individual’s collective utility function,  although one 
might argue that people show a moral satisfaction effect, by overvaluing those programmes 
aiming to remedy high risk conditions. This might be the case of younger students (group 1). 
However, this effect does not seem to be a plausible explanation for the values attached to 
programme 6. In addition, the visibility of an opportunity cost might diminish the moral 
satisfaction effect. Individuals in this experiment are aware that the assignment of an 
excessive monetary valuation to one programme may reduce the available resources for 
alternative programmes. The last column of Table 3 provides the mean estimates of the WTP 
taxes for each program elicited using a payment card. Results suggest that there are significant 
differences in terms of the consistency criteria across groups.  
 
One additional issue is that of invariance to the elicitation method, that is whether 
reference reversals emerge. When implementing the WTAS to a broad set of programmes 
there was some evidence of preference reversals. In order to better capture the existence of 
preference reversals as well as the consistency of the estimates with their ordinal properties, 
Table 5 provides the estimates of the rank-correlation coefficient between rankings elicited 
and the implicit ranking that result from the money-metric valuation of programmes. Since 
our data is ordinal, the best way to test the validity is to test the consistency of rankings. In 
order to do so we apply the Spearman correlation coefficient . The assumption is that  the 
observed ranking can be expressed as follows: 0eVar0eEeVR ij ==+= )(,)(, , that is, the 
ranking of a group can be understood as an addition of  a ‘real’ ranking plus a random error, 
with a zero mean and constant variance. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation 
between the rankings and the random errors, such as between the random errors. From this 
assumption the Spearman coefficient is: 2
x
2
v
XV
2
σ
σσ = , that is to vary between –1 and 1.  
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Table 5.  Ordinal association between preference rankings and WTAS vs WTP 
 
Method WTAS    WTP 
Group Group1 Group2 Goup3 Group4 Group5 Grup6 Group 4 
Spearman 0.9 
(5.8) 
0.745 
(2.2) 
0.855 
(4.6) 
0.67 
(4.5) 
0.62 
(3.2) 
0.80 
(5.6) 
0.34 
(3.9) 
Low 
correlation 
(<0.5) 
3 2 4 4 1 1 10 
High non 
significant 
(>0.5) 
4 2 5 5 5 2 3 
High 
significant  
(>0.5) 
6 4 6 4 3 5 0 
N 13 8 15 13 9 8 13 
*t-value in brackets.  
 
 Results suggest that there are significant differences in terms of the consistency criteria 
across groups. However, for all groups the Spearman correlation coefficient is above 0.6. At 
the individual level only 16 individuals out of 66  exhibit a low association between the 
elicited ranking and the implicit ranking from the WTAS estimates. Interestingly, consistency 
can be attributed to higher skills. Conversely, rankings that could be implicitly derived from 
the WTP responses highlight a low correlation coefficient which remain at the individual level 
for 10 out of 13 individuals. This feature might result from substantial differences in the 
decision-making setting. In addition, we ran WTP regressions for the determinants of income, 
residence, gender and age. Interestingly, gender and residence in about 30 per cent of cases 
are significant predictors of the willingness to pay for certain programmes such as cancer, 
coordination, lifestyles and revision. However, we do not report these results due to the small 
sample size.  
 
Individual consistency could be examined at the aggregate level by employing non 
parametric tests for equality of rankings between both the WTAS and WTP and its rank at the 
programme level. Interestingly, as Table 6 show we cannot reject that both the mean and 
median rank resulting from the WTAS equal the contingent rank. However, WTP could not 
meet the  equality for half of the programmes involved.  
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Table 6.  Test for Equality of Contingent Ranking and the Implicit Rankings from 
WTAS and WTP Estimates  
 
  Willingness to Assign  Willingness to Pay Taxes 
 Wilcoxon* 
(p-value) 
Snedecor and Cochran** 
(p-value) 
Ho: median PR=  median 
WTPR 
Wilcoxon* 
(p-value) 
Snedecor and Cochran** 
(p-value)  
Ho: median PR=  WTPR 
 Ho: 
PR=WTAS 
PR>WTAS PR<WTAS Ho: 
PR=WTP 
Ha: 
PR>WTP 
Ha: PR<WTP 
Attention 0.24 0.94 0.17 0.18 0.98 0.07 
Styles 0.25 0.91 0.25 0.01 0.98 0.07 
Treat 0.27 0.85 0.36 0.07 0.96 0.14 
Bonus 0.83 0.65 0.65 0.43 0.91 0.21 
Odontology 0.59 0.85 0.36 0.94 0.85 0.36 
Coordination 0.32 0.91 0.25 0.92 0.39 0.78 
PPIHCAI 0.43 0.9 0.25 0.19 0.77 0.40 
Lists 0.79 0.74 0.5 0.061 0.006 0.99 
Cancer 0.77 0.5 0.81 0.065 0.08 0.98 
Revision 0.23 0.93 0.22 0.006 0.05 0.99 
* Tests the equality of matched pairs of observations using the signed-ranks test. The null hypothesis is that both 
distributions are the same.  
** Tests that the median of the difference of observations is zero. The alternative hypothesis employed  states 
that the  WTP rank is lower than the preference ranking. 
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
This study has examined the WTAS as a method for eliciting preferences for competing 
healthcare programmes. The method indicates the overall funds that are available for an 
incremental reform of a given health system. The method per se allows individuals to assign 
their funds in the way that arguably best suits their social preferences but when eliciting 
preferences they are constrained by a public budget which is assumed to collectively 
collected. This study can be seen as a contribution to the ongoing debate on whether the WTP 
should be used to aid priority setting in healthcare (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998). Unlike the 
WTP, the WTAS deals with social preferences and enables the individuals to be aware of 
collective budget restrictions. However, the values that are elicited cannot be interpreted as 
absolute, but rather relative valuations.  
 
According to this limited small-scale experimental evidence, the willingness to assign 
seems to be less misrepresented by the preference reversal phenomenon than the willingness 
to pay approach. The WTAS estimates are to a large extent consistent predictors of individual 
preferences. Results obtained from a rank correlation analysis in this context indicate that the 
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WTAS is a better predictor of individual preferences than the WTP taxes. Thus, this provides 
some support for the view that the WTAS captures individuals’ relative valuation (relative 
preference) of a single health system improvement.  Despite the fact that one could argue ex - 
ante that the method is too complex, evidence suggests that in fact it works well in 
deliberative and collective settings. This method can be an extension of the inherent 
rationality of assigning a budget in a collective setting, such as that of individual families.  
 
Whereas WTP refers to an individual assessment of the value of a good as a consumer, the 
WTAS might deal with  collective preferences closely linked to political concerns. The 
willingness to assign, however, is more closely connected to the Kanheman and Ritov (1994) 
contribution model suggesting the willingness to contribute as a citizen to the funding of a 
particular programme. Conversely, individuals eliciting their WTP are theoretically limited to 
their budget rather than to a collective budget contraint. Therefore, the respondent might  
actually experience an unknown trade-off between the programme and other unknown goods. 
Therefore, even accepting that the WTP could be a measure of preference intensity, this 
would not express the real trade-offs that are implicit in decision-making settings 
 
Our results, although from a small-scale study, exhibit remarkable associations 
between individual priorities and values, which can be understood as better capturing the 
decision-making problem perspective. Therefore, in the light of these results the experimental 
study identifies evidence pointing out that the WTAS seems to be internally more consistent 
than for alternative methods. However, we should bear in mind the  reduced sample size and 
that some  preference reversals pre-exist. Some explanation for larger consistency might not 
be attributed only to the method nut to the feature that the experiment seemed quite realistic to 
participants as far as the programs under evaluation were effectively under scrutiny by the 
Catalan health service. We believe that realism is an important matter to pursue when 
designing experiments.  
 
The study reveals that  there is something more  than health gain in the individuals 
health related utility functions. Furthermore, these other attributes  play a role when 
examining preferences for healthcare programmes. Therefore, if we extend the finding that  
health system benefits go beyond pure health gains, instruments assuming an a priori 
dimension of benefit may misrepresent individual preferences. . However, although there is 
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evidence in the literature (Nord et al., 1995) that people might not respond to the QALY 
maximisation model, programmes dealing with health gain appear to receive the highest 
relative valuation.  
 
This study is a first attempt at implementing a preference elicitation method to assist 
priority setting for a large number of competing health programmes. However, it is not 
without limitations. As other elicitation techniques, respondents might be affected by the 
effect of uncertain effect of their decisions, framing of questions, heuristics and availability of 
information (Viscusi, 1989)  The first notable limitation is feature that individuals might wish 
to allocate funds to other health programmes. In this respect the method employed is 
limitative, although slightly less limitative than WTP methods. However, unlike the WTP, 
individuals are not allowed to keep funds for themselves. Participants were told that any 
additional funds would be assigned somewhere else, but none of the participants left any 
funds to assign. This might be consistent with the fact that healthcare ranks as the first public 
expenditure priority, as revealed in public opinion surveys. Although it might be an operative 
tool to guide priority setting, it should be recognised that the incremental approach might 
limit the scope for health reform. Further research may need to examine the WTAS in  a 
setting that enables participants to forgo already covered programmes. Finally, although the 
methods and the warming up through a deliberative approach were intended to encourage 
individuals to respond according to a collective decision-making approach, it might well be 
the case that some individuals responded strategically as significant differences were 
identified among health programmes. Therefore, issues relating to aggregation might restrict 
this approach to some extent. Costa (2003) analysed the social consistency of the WTAS 
approach by examining  whether WTAS estimates were consistent with a social ranking 
which did not violate the Arrow impossibility conditions by combining the majority rule and 
the borda rule. Results suggested that on aggregate, rankings implicitly derived from the 
WTAS were highly correlated with the hypothetically derived social rule.   
 18
References  
 
Blomquist, GC, Newsome, MA and Brad Stone, D (2004). ‘Public Preferences for Program 
Tradeoffs: Community Values for Budget Priorities’, Public Budgeting & Finance,  24: 50-
71.  
Brekke, K.A. et al. (1996) ‘Allowing Disagreement in Evaluations of Social Welfare,’ 
Journal of Economics, vol.  63, no. 3, pp. 303–24 
Clark, T.M.(1974) ‘Can you Buy a Budget Pie?,’ Policy and Politics, vol. 3, pp. 3–31. 
Common, M. (1997) ‘Do Existence Values for Cost-Benefit Analysis Exist?,’ J 
Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 9, pp.  225–38.  
 Cookson, R. and Dolan, P. (1999) ‘Public Views on Health Care Rationing a Group 
Discussion Study,’ Health Policy, vol. 49, pp. 63–74. 
Cookson, R. (2000) ‘Incorporating Psycho-Social Considerations into Health Valuation: an 
Experimental Study,’ Journal of Health Economics, vol. 19, pp. 369–401.  
Costa, J. (2003) ‘Establecimiento de prioridades, participación colectiva y decisión publica en 
sanidad,’ Información Comercial Española, Revista de Economía, vol. 804, pp. 141–55.  
Dolan, P., Cookson, R. and Ferguson, B. (1999) ‘Effect of Discussion and Deliberation on the 
Public’s Views of Priority Setting in Health Care: Focus Groups Study,’ BMJ, vol. 318, pp. 
916–19. 
Dolan, P., Olsen, J.A., Menzel, P. and Richardson, J. (2002) ‘An Inquiry into the Different 
Perspectives that can be Used when Eliciting Preferences in Health,’ Health Economics (in 
press).  
Donaldson, C. and Shackley, P. (1997) ‘Does “Process Utility” exist? A Case Study of 
Willingness to Pay for Laparoscopic Cholescystectomy,’ Social Science and Medicine, vol. 
44, no. 5, pp. 699–707. 
Donaldson, C. (1990) ‘Willingness to Pay for Publicly Provided Goods: a Possible Measure 
of Benefit?,’ Journal of Health Economics, vol. 9, pp. 103–18. 
Eddy, D.M. (1991) ‘Oregon’s Methods: Did Cost-Effective  Analysis Fail?,’ Journal of the 
American Medical Association, vol. 266, pp. 2135–41 
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2002) ‘Why Social Preferences Matter — The Impact of Non-
Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives,’ Economic Journal, vol. 112, 
pp. 1–33 
Kahneman, D. and Ritov, I. (1995) ‘Determinants of Stated Willingness to Pay for Public 
Goods:  A Study in the Headline Method,’ Journal-of-Risk-and-Uncertainty, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 
5–38 
Margolis, H. (1982) Selfishness Altruism & Rationality. A Theory of Social Choice (The 
University of Chicago Press). 
Mooney,  G. (1995) ‘Efficiency in Health Care: Just Health Gains?,’ Australian Journal of 
Public Health, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 330–5. 
Mooney, G. (1994) ‘Key Issues in Health Economics (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).  
Nord, E., Richardson, J., Street, A., Kuhse, H., Singer, P. (1995) ‘Maximising Health Benefits 
versus Egalitarism: an Australian Survey of Health Issues,’ Social Science and Medicine, vol. 
41, pp. 1429–37.   
Nord, E., Pinto, J.L., Richardson, G., Menzel, P. and  Ubel, P. (1999) ‘Incorporating Societal 
Concerns for Fairness in Numerical Valuations of Health Programs,’ Health Economics, vol. 
8, pp. 25–39. 
 19
Olsen, J.A. and Donaldson, C. (1997) ‘Helicopters, Hearts and Hips: Using Willingness to 
Pay to Set Priorities for Public Sector Health Care Programmes,’ Social Science and 
Medicine, vol. 52, pp. 345–69. 
Pauly, M.V. (1995) ‘Valuing Benefits in Money Terms,’ in Frank Sloan (ed.), Valuing Health 
Care, Benefits and Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical and Other Medical Technologies 
(Cambridge), pp. 99–124.  
Petters, R.A (1996). ‘School Finance Reform’s Impact on New Jersey’s State Spending 
Priorities’. Public Budgeting and Finance, 16: 74-89.  
Robins, MD and Simonsen, B (2002). ‘A Dynamic Method of Citizens Preference 
Revelation’. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 14: 445-
461.   
Shackley, P. and Donaldson, C. (2000) ‘Willingness to Pay for Publicly-Financed Health 
Care: How Should we Use the Numbers?,’ Applied Economics, vol. 32, pp. 2015–21.  
Shiell, A. and Gold, L. (2002) ‘If the Price is Right: Vagueness and Values Clarification in 
Contingent Valuation,’ Health Economics (in press).  
Thomas, R., Donaldson, C. and Torgeston (2000) ‘Who Answers “Willingness to Pay” 
Questions?,’ Journal of Health Service Research and Policy, vol. 5, pp. 7–11. 
Viscusi, W.K (1989). ‘Prospect Reference Theory : Towards an Explanation of the 
Paradoxes’. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2(3): 235-264.  
 20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
